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THE AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF UNIONS




In endeavoring to state the aims and objectives of unions and man-
agement, one is tempted to indulge in hopeful generalities. Possibly
one might say something like this:
Unions and employers have a mutual stewardship and a com-
mon trust, the true beneficiaries of which are the employees and
the general public. This is a common bond of interest between
the union and the employer which should lead to intelligent and
honorable settlements. When both parties show a deep concern
for the continued economic progress of the enterprise and
for the welfare of the employees, and when they approach their
relationship to each other with mutual respect and a spirit of
compromise, then a peaceful resolution of all questions will be
assured.
While I do not by any means decry sincere efforts to establish mu-
tuality of understanding and constructive relationships, I feel that
we must be aware of the realities existing in the ordinary union-
management relations. Regardless of what the ultimate ideal might
be, lawyers must concern themselves with the aims and objectives as
they relate to particular situations and to specific management and
union personalities. Of course, there should be constant, intense
efforts to improve relationships, but such efforts, like pious preach-
ments, will be.meaningless unless the real nature of the relationships
is thoroughly understood. It is impossible to generalize as to what
the objectives of either party might be in any particular situation
because many variables affect the relationship. These variables in-
clude such factors as the general economic and political climate, the
economics of the company, the industry, and the community, the his-
tory of the relationship, the personalities involved, technological de-
velopments and many. others. These variables mean that specific ob-
jectives are ever changing and dynamic. While some broad generali-
ties might be set forth, exceptions almost always have to be made.
* This article is based upon a lecture delivered by the author in conjunction
with the continuing legal education program jointly sponsored by the Washington
University School of Law and the Bar Association of St. Louis.
t Member of the Missouri Bar.
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LABOR PEACE AND CONFLICT
Today it is popular to talk about "labor peace" as a proper objective
of the parties. The term has pleasant connotations, but what is "labor
peace"? Obviously "labor peace" is not an end in and of itself. Man-
agement can buy labor peace, in one sense of the term, by acquiescing
in every demand made by the union. On the other hand, there can be
a form of "peace" where the union is subservient. Experience has
demonstrated that peace acquired in either one of these ways is not
necessarily wholesome, nor economically or socially beneficial. Sub-
servient managements can be forced out of business or into a marginal
economic position., Subservient unions can be explosively displaced
by more militant organizations or productivity can become so lethargic
that it is uneconomic.
While there are many exceptions in specific situations, the objec-
tives of unions and management by their very nature involve conflict.2
Indeed, a free economy implies the necessity of differences of opinion
between the various segments of our economy. Any attempt at total
elimination of conflict would undoubtedly lead to a totalitarian regime
which would be objectionable to all.- The real problem with respect to
industrial conflict is to keep the conflict within socially approved
bounds and to develop methods of resolving differences intelligently
and constructively. The acceptable bounds of conflict change from
time to time, from industry to industry, and from one economic situ-
ation to another. They are affected by the tensions of existing or past
conflicts, by abuses or excesses of power, by the ascendancy or de-
scendancy of various political and economic notions, and by many
other factors. Government determines the maximum bounds within
which the conflict may take place.4 While the parties have a right to
pursue proper objectives within those bounds, they also have a respon-
sibility for minimizing the detrimental aspects of conflict and for not
abusing their freedom.-
1. Rishig, Union Influ nce on Management Decisions in the Automobile In-
d(utrg, in PROCEEDINGS OF SEVENTH ANNUAL INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH
Ass'N 1954, at 29-32 (Tripp ed. 1955). An example of a company which has been
placed in a marginal position partly because of its prior concessions to the union
is the Studebaker Company. In an" effort to regain a more competitive position,
the last two contracts between the company and the union have modified many
provisions previously considered favorable to the union, including such matters as
seniority, bumping, transfers, production standards, number of stewards, deter-
mination of ability and inability to perform work, and establishment of straight-
time basis of hourly pay. There were, however, 85 unauthorized work stoppages
durmin negotiations, and the 1955 contract was ratified by only 53.45% of the
employees voting. Wall Street Journal, Jan. 9, 1956, p. 3, cols. 1, 2.
2. BAKKE, MUTUAL SURVIVAL: THE GOAL OF UNIONS AND MANAGEMENT (1946);
IN DT STRIXL CONFLICT (Kornhauser, Dubin & Ross eds. 1954).
9. WUNDERLICH, GERMAN LABOR COURTS (1946).
4. TAYLOR, GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (1948).
5. CHAMBERLAIN, SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND STRIKES (1953); SEIDMAN, UNION
RIGHTS AND UNION DUTIES (1943).
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Public policy in regard to unions has completely reversed itself
since The Philadelphi Cordwainers Case in 1806, where it was held
that a union formed by workmen to raise wages to benefit themselves
was an unlawful conspiracy.6 Today, of course, the right of employees
to form or join unions is clearly recognized. The principle of col-
lective bargaining is firmly established as federal policy in the Labor-
Management Relations Act of 1947. 7
Before collective bargaining can exist there must be not only an em-
ployer, but there must also be a labor organization. So we might
properly inquire why employees form or join unions.8 There are many
reasons. One reason is that employees believe that with a union they
can advance their economic interests and improve their working con-
ditions more effectively. Another reason is that employees feel that
they can obtain job security and protection against arbitrary action
on the part of the employer. Some join because they have a feeling
of a "cause." They feel that the union gives them a means of expres-
sion and is an effective political force to represent their interests.
Some join because they are compelled to join,9 either directly by way
of a union or closed shop, or indirectly by social pressures. On the
other hand, there are reasons why people do not join or form unions.10
Some feel that their company is doing a good job and that a union is
either unnecessary or undesirable. Some dislike unions from what
they know about them; they often associate unions with gangsterism,
communism, or the tactics of strike and violence. Some do not join
because they do not like the political trend in unionism. Some do not
join because they feel that union policies, seniority for instance,11
would be inimical to their welfare. Some do not join because they are
coerced into not joining by their employer or by social pressures.
Some unions have an institutional existence which, at times, the
unions feel must be protected, perpetuated or extended-even if such
action is contrary to the best interests of all or any particular part of
their membership. The union is different from the totality of its
membership. Moreover, a union is a political institution.2 Its officers
6. The Philadelphia Cordwainers Case, in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF AImir-
CAN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 59 (Commons & Gilmore eds. 1910).
7. 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-88 (1952).
8. VITLEs, MOTIVATION AND MORALE IN INDUSTRY 333-58 (1953); Seidman,
London & Karsh, Why Workers Join Unions, 275 ANNALS 75 (1951).
9. ROSE, UNION SOLIDARITY (1952) found that 45.9% of the members of the
union studied by him joined the union because they worked in a union shop and
had to join.
10. MAPES, MEN AND UNIONS (1950).
11. Sayles, Seniority: An Internal Union Problem, HARv. Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb.
1952, p. 55.
12. The internal and external political aspects of unions can have profound
effect upon union-management relations. Consequently, companies must be alert
to the political implications. Kerr, The Collective Bargaining Environment, in
CAUSES OF INDUSTRIAL PEACE UNDER COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 44 (Golden & Parker
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must be constantly alert to both the internal and external political
ramifications of any action they take or fail to take. While there are
some "vest pocket" unions where the officers can determine what
action they want to take without consulting the membership, in most
unions, particularly at the local level, the officers are constantly aware
of the fact that they might be displaced.'3 This naturally causes
unons as institutions to vie with each other in obtaining benefits and
extending their jurisdiction. In many cases this compulsion is in-
tensified by the personal aspirations and ambitions of the leaders
themselves-they want to achieve a certain status or degree of power.
ORGANIZING THE UNORGANIZED
Organizing the unorganized is necessarily a major objective of
unions. Basically, this is so because union men are convinced that
unions are essential if the interests of laboring people are to be pro-
tected and advanced. There are other reasons why unions feel it
necessary to organize the unorganized. Unions feel insecure as long
as there is a substantial number of unorganized workers in any par-
ticular industry or area, because there is the possibility that the un-
organized plants will get all the work. This is particularly true if
there is a strike or if there are significant labor cost differentials. It
is not uncommon for organized employers to argue that they cannot
grant various union demands because the cost of the demands would
make it impossible to compete with unorganized employers. Hence,
the unions are compelled in such circumstances to try to organize the
the unorganized in order to secure additional gains in organized com-
panies. In addition, the broadest possible membership will give the
most effective power position and the best political force, and will
improve the financial position of unions.
What happens when a union endeavors to organize the unorgan-
lzed? First, it should be noted that there is a distinction between
"unions organizing the employees" and "employees organizing a
e.ds. 1955). Companies tend to support established leaders with whom good work-
ing relations have been developed. If the union leader is too closely identified
with management, he runs the risk of being removed from leadership. On the
othrr hand, some union representatives use the argument that they have to get
more gains if they are to maintain their leadership or avoid a raid by another
union In some instances, companies have made inadvisable concessions in re-
sponse to such arguments. See Garfield & Whyte, The Collective Bargaining
Prr,,.: A Human Analysis, HUMAN OROANizAnoN, Fall 1950, p. 10.
1 3. Officers of national and international unions generally have a fairly secure
tenure in office. TAFn, THE STRUCTUR, AND Go rRNNrNT or LABR UNIONS 35-64
(1954). Local officers, on the other hand, are much more susceptible to displace-
ment because of internal political factionalism or rank-and-file dissatisfaction
with their performance. SAes & STRAUss, Tan LocAl. UNION 132-54 (1953).
For a criticism of the perpetuation of power within unions, see Eby, A Critical
1,aak at Laor, LABOR AND NATION, Fall 1951, p. 39.
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union.' 14 Normally, the union approaches the employees and endeavors
to convince them of the advantages the union can produce. It is com-
mon to list the benefits which exist in various contracts and to claim
that with the union these benefits can be won from the employer.
Where the economic benefits are.relatively equal, the union makes the
argument that the employees are getting the indirect benefits of
unions and are free riders, and that as a matter of moral obligation
they should support the union.
Perhaps more significant than economic factors in most organ-
izing campaigns are the existing grievances, blocked aspirations, and
general feelings, real or imaginary, of personal insecurity which exist
in almost every organization. Conflicts usually exist in a company,
and the union capitalizes on these conflicts. Examples are: the ac-
tions of arbitrary, and sometimes tyrannical, foremen or other super-
visors; sudden layoffs or arbitrary promotions; and personal dissatis-
factions resulting from almost any cause. The union utilizes these
underlying dissatisfactions and conflicts in endeavoring to convince
the employees that they need a union and that a union will solve
their problems.
In building up the campaign, the union organizer will frequently
describe the employer in bitter, harsh, and trenchant words. At this
stage, emotional appeals are frequently more effective than logical
appeals. 5 It is for this reason that many unions utilize totally differ-
ent personnel for organizing from the ones used for bargaining. The
organizer must be able to make the emotional appeal, to create hos-
tility toward the employer while building up a feeling of need for
the union. The bargainer, on the other hand, generally has the job
of mitigating the emotions of hostility and of developing an attitude
which is predominantly based on logic and which looks forward to a
continuing relationship.
Sometimes the union completely by-passes the employees and goes
directly to the employer to demand that the employer either sign a
contract or tell the employees, in effect, that he wants them to join
the union. If the employer refuses, then the union either approaches
the employees or uses more coercive means of achieving its objectives.
14. This distinction has current importance in judicial consideration of statu-
tory and constitutional provisions guaranteeing in one form or another the right
of employees to organize and bargain through representatives of their own
choosing. Benetar & Isaacs, Pickets or Ballots, 40 A.B.A.J. 848 (1954). See
Pappas v. Stacey, 116 A.2d 497 (Me. 1955), appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 870(1956); Bellerive Country Club v. McVey, 284 S.W.2d 492 (Mo. 1955); Chucales
v. Royalty, 164 Ohio 214, 129 N.E.2d 823 (1955). Some unions contend that where
"employees" are granted the right to organize, as in Mo. CONST. art. I, § 29
(1945), it means "labor" and the right of unions to organize employees, but does
not protect or confer any right on employees to refrain from organizing.
15. SELEKMAN, LABoR RELATIONS AND HumiAN RELATIONS 12-41 (1947).
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Similarly, if the direct appeal to the employees does not prove to be
fruitful, some unions will indulge in the coercive techniques of the
picket line or the boycott. The objective of these techniques is to in-
jure the employer economically so that he, or his employees, will suc-
cumb to the demand of the union. These techniques are frequently
quite effective in achieving the desired objective.
Let us now turn to employer attitudes toward the organizing cam-
paign. Here we find a whole gamut of attitudes. There are some em-
ployers who are bitterly anti-union. They will use all available re-
sources to prevent the union gaining recognition, regardless of the
law. In some respects, this type of employer is of the same ilk as
the racketeering union. Neither is typical of the vast majority of
employers or unions and they will not be considered here. At the
other end of the gamut are those employers who are quite willing for
their employees to organize. They, in effect, welcome the union, or at
least recognize that the union is a natural development in the par-
ticular situation. Between the two extremes are numerous gradations.
If an employer is in a community or industry where labor is fairly
well organized and where relationships in the other companies are,
on the whole, constructive, his attitude is likely to be much different
from that of one who is not in such a situation. At the present time
organizational drives primarily involve medium-sized and smaller
employers. For the purpose of simplifying this discussion, I shall
examine a rather common attitude of the smaller employer confronted
with an organizing campaign. He readily recognizes that unions are
a definite part of our economic and social structure. The employer
usually believes that unions exist to gain fair wages and to protect
employees from arbitrary action. As to his operation, he usually feels
that he is paying good rates for the work performed considering
the circumstances under which he has to operate. He usually thinks
that management has been sound, and he not infrequently refers to
the employees as being well-satisfied or sometimes even as a "happy
family." He feels that, with few exceptions, the employees on the
whole do not really want a union. Actually, the predominant factor
affecting an employer faced with an organizing drive is the uncer-
tainty of it all. He knows that if the business is organized, things are
going to be different, but he is not sure just how or in what way they
will be different. He has heard many things about unions and about
how they affect management's right to operate the business. It is
fundamental that men facing major, but unknown and undefinable,
changes have certain psychological reactions which are not always
logical. Since the very purpose of a union is to produce changes, few
unions can provide evidence to calm the employer's fears as to what
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1956/iss2/2
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these changes mean.le As has been previously indicated, the union at
this very point is frequently building up a campaign against the
employer-the employer becomes an evil to be subdued. Here we have
a situation filled with uncertainties and apprehensions. If the union
indulges in a bitter campaign, studded with glowing promises about
what it is going to make the employer do, the employer's fears and
resentments become more fixed. Similarly, if the employer indulges
in such activities as discriminatory discharges, the union becomes
necessarily more determined to organize the outfit. The LMRA does
prohibit certain conduct of both employers and unions as unfair labor
practices, 1 but these will not be considered here. Aside from the
strictly legal aspects, the nature of the organizing campaign ob-
viously has tremendous effect upon subsequent relationships if the
company does become organized. It is here, in the heat of an organ-
izing campaign, that the lawyer frequently first comes into play and
finds himself concerned with the aims and objectives of the parties.
We will assume that the lawyer, whether he represents management
or union, is going to do a thorough job of representing the client's
interests to the best of his judgment and abilities. The client is en-
titled to have that kind of representation. Mere recognition of a
client's legal rights is not the whole answer, however; there are basic
problems involving human relationships to consider. Indeed, pursuit
of legal rights and remedies can have dangerous practical conse-
quences.
The lawyer cannot avoid getting involved in the nonlegal aspects
of the relationship. Let us consider two simple situations. The union
desires to place the maximum economic pressure on the employer. It
goes to its lawyer and outlines a proposed program of action which
includes a clearly prohibited secondary boycott, some clearly per-
missible activities, and also some borderline activities.18 The lawyer
16. The union usually points out that it has good relations with other com-
panies in the industry or the community. This argument is not always too con-
vincing to the employer for two reasons: (1) Each company usually feels that
there is something unique about its operation which will be adversely affected by
union 'policies, even though other companies accept some of those policies. (2)
When the other companies are contacted they give varying reports as to the na-
ture of the relationship with the union. Even where the company considers the
relationship to be good, it nevertheless points out that it has had problems which
had to be solved.
17. 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a) (1)-(5) (1952) establishes em-
ployer unfair labor practices, and §§ 158(b) (1)-(6) establishes union unfair
labor practices.
18. The legality or illegality of many activities is most uncertain. Moreover,
interpretations change in some circumstances. Sometimes the only way the parties
can determine whether or not certain conduct is prohibited or protected is to en-
gage in the conduct and run the risk of violation. Similarly, where either party
feels an existing interpretation is erroneous, it can sometimes challenge that
interpretation only by engaging in conduct prohibited by the existing interpreta-
tion. The lawyer has a duty to represent the client in securing a clarification of
the law, but such situations present most difficult problems to the lawyer. The
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would undoubtedly advise against the clearly illegal action, but the
borderline activities present another question. The lawyer would
probably inquire in some detail into both the purpose and the means
of the contemplated activity. He would necessarily be concerned with
the aims and objectives because their nature might well determine
the potential legality or illegality of the conduct. Moreover, he almost
inevitably would have to consider the practical ramifications of the
conduct. He would have to raise questions of whether the specific
conduct would endanger the achievement of either the immediate or
longrun aims. He would have to raise questions of whether or not
other alternatives might not be more effective. Thus, the lawyer finds
himself helping to formulate the aims of his client.
The management lawyer faces comparable situations. Suppose that
a ci ,mpany comes to its lawer and wants to discharge some of the
"trouble makers," saying "They are not good workers anyway and
should have been discharged a long time ago." The company also
wants to write letters to the employees telling them the "truth" about
what is going on and answering the union's "scurrilous and false"
charges. Again the lawyer will advise against the illegal. When
he tackles the question of the letter, however, he faces difficult prob-
lem. It is simple enough to tell the client that he can write letters
giving his position and answering the union's charges so long as he
does. not make threats or promises of benefits. When the company be-
gi ns to ask whether it can say specific things, the lawyer will often find
it necessary to inquire about the reasons behind the proposed state-
ments and what is hoped to be achieved. As the details are discussed,
the odds are that the lawyers will end up drafting the letters or re-
writing drafts submitted by the client. In the course of this process,
the lawyer will have to think about what are the real aims of the com-
panv. Is the objective to win a battle of the typewriters? What will
he the practical effect of the letters upon the employees or upon the
union? Here again the lawyer necessarily becomes involved in formu-
lating aims. He might indeed have to inform his client that the client's
concept of the employees as the big happy family is not necessarily the
true picture. He might have to point out to the company the danger
of a letter backfiring.
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
After a union gains recognition, the stage is set for collective bar-
gaining. The concept of "collective bargaining," though universally
consequenccs of such determinations can drastically affect the practical relation-
ships of the parties. All of the ramifications must be carefully weighed to deter-
mine whiether any course of action is advisable, from both a practical and a legal
standpoint.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1956/iss2/2
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
used, is illusive when one tries to give a precise definition. Section 8
(d) of the LMRA states in part:
[T] o bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obliga-
tion of the employer and the representative of the employees to
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or
the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereun-
der, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any
agreement reached if requested by either party, but such obliga-
tion does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require
the making of a concession....19
It can easily be seen that this definition leaves a lot unsaid, and I be-
lieve any other definition would have to be equally indefinite.
The term "collective bargaining" necessarily implies that there are
differences between the parties. If there were no differences, there
would be no necessity for bargaining. Moreover, the bargaining im-
plies that each party has something that it wants which requires some
concession by the other party. Collective bargaining is a method of
accommodating interests. It is a process by which representatives of
management and union discuss and negotiate the various phases of
their relationships with the objective of arriving at a mutually accept-
able labor agreement. The law does not, however, require the parties
to reach an agreement, nor may the NLRB compel concessions or
otherwise sit in judgment upon the substantive terms of collective
agreements. 20 Consequently, if the parties do not reach an agreement,
they are free to use their economic powers.
It should be noted that while the act does place some limitations on
the right to strike, such as strikes during the sixty-day notice period
and strikes in violation of section 8 (b) (4), the act basically recog-
nizes the "cherished right" of organized labor to strike. 21 The strike
is a fundamental weapon in the arsenal of industrial conflict, and it is
the Damocles sword that hangs over collective bargaining.
The rationalization of collective bargaining is predicated on the no-
tion that the single employee is powerless to bargain realistically with
19. 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1952).
20. NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 404 (1951). The Court
states:
That Section contains the express provision that the obligation to bargain
collectively does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require
the making of a concession.
And it is equally clear that the Board may not, either directly or indi-
rectly, compel concessions or otherwise sit in judgment upon the substantive
terms of collective bargaining agreements.
See Cox & Dunlop, Regulation of Collective Bargaining by the National Labor
Relations Board, 63 HARv. L. REv. 389 (1950).
21. 61 STAT. 151 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1952) provides:
Except as specifically provided for in this subchapter nothing shall interfere
with or diminish the right to strike and nothing is to be construed to affect
the limitations or qualifications on the right to strike.
See also Daykin, The Right to Strike, 6 LAB. L.J. 361 (1955).
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an employer. The days when coal operators, and others, extracted yel-
low-dog contracts from their employees easily demonstrates this fact.2
The employer could, and frequently did, say to any worker: "These
are the conditions, and if you do not like them, somebody else will."
It was thus felt that if the helpless and defenseless employees could
form or join unions and then bargain collectively through their union,
there would be a balance of bargaining power. Therefore, our laws
were eventually designed to encourage the formation of unions and
the principle of collective bargaining. There have been some drastic
changes, however. Now some unions are of vast size and have in-
finitely more power and resources than the employers with whom
they bargain. In the small entrepreneur industries it is not uncom-
mon for a union to mail contracts to literally a thousand employers,
gasoline station owners, for example, with a covering letter requesting
that the enclosed contract be executed and stating, in effect, that if it
is not, there will be a strike. Where unions have the power to force
contracts on a take-it-or-leave-it basis or on a pattern basis, there is
no more bargaining than in the situation of a corporate employer with
an individual employee. As has been stated, "In both cases the 'bar-
gaining table' is a myth.' 'L
To meet this imbalance of power, employers sometimes form groups
or associations to bargain with the union. Often the union encourages
such group bargaining. In some instances this type of bargaining has
had satisfactory results, but it presents many additional complex prob-
lems.- Except in some clearly identifiable industry groupings, em-
ployers do not have sufficient mutuality of interests to agree upon
common goals. Usually, the aims and goals, the methods of doing busi-
ness, the internal operations, etc., preclude effective agreement.
This is illustrated by the 1954 New York City teamsters' negotia-
tions and strike. The negotiations commenced as group bargaining.
The group represented many types of hauling operations, including
some large chain grocery stores. Because the increased costs of the
teamsters' demands represented such a small fraction of their total
costs and a strike closed their total operations, the chain groceries
capitulated on the first day of the strike. This led to a complete disin-
22. SEIDMN, THE YELow DOG CONTRACT (1932).
28. CARPENTER, EMPLOYERS' ASSOCIATION AND COLECTnV BARGAINING IN NEW
YORK CITY 12 (1950).
24. BRAUN, UNION-MANAGEMENT CO-OPERATION (1947); CARPENTER, EPLOYERS'
ASSOCIATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN NEW YORK CITY (1950); SMITH,
LOCAL EMPLOYERS' AssoCIATIONS (1955). See also the series of studies on indus-
try-wide collective bargaining published by the University of Pennsylvania, e.g.,
ABERSOLD, PROBLEMS OF HOURLY RATE UNIFORMITY (1949); KENNEDY, THE SIG-
NIFICANCE OF WAGE UNIFORMITY (1949); LEvY, MuLTI-EMPLOYER BARGAINING AND
THE ANTI-TRUST LAWS (1949); PIERSON, MULTI-EMPLOYER BARGAINING: NATURE
AND SCOPE (1948); PoLLAK, SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF INDUSTRY-WIDE BARGAINING
(1948).
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tegration of group bargaining. Once the group was broken, there was
no further bargaining. One of the locals involved, Local 807, opened
its offices so that employers could come down and sign. Employers
formed a queue at the union office to sign the take-it-or-leave-it con-
tract. The president of the local stated that on October 19, 1954, it had
signed 587 individual contracts out of a possible 1,000 by 5:30 p.m.
when the union closed its office. 25
The development of group bargaining drastically changes the ob-
jectives of the constituent members of the group. It also tends to
create monolithic bargaining structures, which, some think, pose seri-
ous questions as to its effect on our economy.
UNION OBJECTIVES
Regardless of the form of the bargaining structure, there are some
general objectives of unions which are common to most unions. First,
unions want to get "more" for their members. This was clearly stated
by Samuel Gompers and has recently been repeated by George
Meany.26 By "more" the unions principally mean higher wages, more
holidays, vacations, pensions and other economic benefits. There is
nothing wrong with unions wanting to get more for their members. It
is traditional in our country to stimulate the desire for more, as the ad-
vertisements in our popular magazines well attest. Moreover, the
stimuli of union demands have had a general salutary effect in causing
management to become more efficient in order to meet some of the de-
mands. This, however, is not without some problems for unions, be-
cause it sometimes leads to mechanization and other activities which,
in turn, might affect adversely the employment opportunities. 2 Just
what a union will want as "more" will depend on what it thinks the
particular company can pay, what is being paid by other companies in
the area or industry, what other unions are demanding or getting,
and similar factors.
Second, unions want to establish procedures for protecting the job
security of their members. One of the major procedures usually
sought is a grievance procedure ending in arbitration. However, some
unions today are rejecting the principle of arbitration and are de-
manding a grievance procedure whereby they can reject arbitration
and utilize the strike and other economic powers.28 Other types of
25. New York Herald-Tribune, Oct. 19, 1954.
26. Meany, What Labor Means by "More," Fortune, March 1955, p. 92.
27. S UCTER, UNION POLICIES AND INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT 201-81 (1941).
See also BROWN, UNION POLICIES IN THE LEATHER INDUSTRY (1947).
28. This is illustrated in the Central States Local Cartage agreement with the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters covering employers in a thirteen-state
area for a period from February 1, 1955 to January 31, 1961. The agreement
authorizes the use of economic recourse or strikes under numerous circumstances
such as: (a) in the event a part of the agreement is declared invalid and the
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clauses calculated to protect the job security of the employees include
such clauses as seniority, jurisdictional assignment, plant removal,
mutual agreement, guaranteed annual wage, contracting work out, and
sale of business.L'
A third general objective is the protection of the institutional se-
curity of the union. "" What a union will consider necessary to obtain
security will vary with the circumstances. The union shop is, of
cou i'se, primarily designed to protect the union's security. Unions fear
that if employees are not compelled to support the union financially,
there will be many free riders. Moreover, requiring membership is an
overt act which tends in and of itself to create in the employees a feel-
ing of loyalty to the union. The union shop also makes it difficult for
the employees to switch allegiance to another union or to abandon the
incumbent union. The control of the jobs by apprenticeship systems,
partit-s ao'- unable to reach agzeement on a substitute provision; (b) in the event
the parties cannot reach agreement as to application of changes in FLSA; (c) in
the event the parties are unable to agree on the details as to "piggy back" opera-
tions; (d) in the event there is a deadlock in settling grievances; (e) in the event
the employer insists that employees handle unfair goods; (f) in the event of a
fal ute to aqree upon various reopenings provided in the agreement. Art. VIII,
h 1(b) provides:
I n the event of strikes or work stoppages or other activities which are per-
mitted in case of deadlock, default or failure to agree, no interpretation of
this Agreement by any tribunal shall be binding upon the union or affect the
legality or lawfulness of the strike unless the union stipulates to be bound by
such interpretation, it being the intention of the parties to resolve all ques-
tions of interpretation by mutual agreement unless otherwise agreed to.
Nothing herein shall prevent legal proceedings by the employer where the
strike is in violation of this agreement.
For a statement of the philosophy back of this type of agrement, see Hoffa,
Handlg Grievances, Union Viewpoint, in PROCEEDINGS OF AIERICAN TRUCKING
ASSOW2IATIONS, INC.-NAToNAL FoRu.Ni ON TRUCKING INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 10-18,
46-72 (195).
2., Sometimes there is a conflict between the union's security activities and the
security interests of particular employees. The senate committee on labor and
public welfare pointed out that while unions may get along satisfactorily with
particular employers, "they may also join in a campaign which incidentally hurts
his business; they may be willing to overthrow a long-existing welfare program
for something the labor movement is now pushing." Senate Labor & Public Wel-
fare Committee, Factors in Succes.rfzd Collective Bargaining, 82d Cong., 1st
Sess 10o (Comm. print 1951).
30. Another phase in the question of the union's institutional security, which
is also related to other union objectives, is the extent to which it endeavors to
control or affect any function of the enterprise which relates to the interests of
workecs. Meany, Wh1at Labor Means by "More," Fortune, March 1955, pp. 92, 93,
states:
A union exists to protect the livelihood and interests of a worker. Those
matters that do not touch a worker directly, a union cannot and will not
challenge.... But where management decisions affect a worker directly, a
union will intervene.
Mr. Meany refers to such things as plant location. The conflicts in the area of
"management prerogatives" are patent. At times there have been some indications
of union support of co-determination. The CIO at its annual convention in 1951
adopted a resolution calling for the establishment of industrial councils and de-
manding equal union authority with respect to (1) prices, (2) production levels,
(3) rates and nature of capital investment, (4) rates and nature of technological
change, and (5) the site and location of plants and other matters. 1951 CIO
PROCEEDINGS 51.
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the hiring hall, and the like are conceived to protect the union as well
as the existing employees. 31 The development of the stewardship sys-
tem is usually considered essential for the security of the union and
for the policing of the contract.
A fourth major general objective of unions is really a reflection of
the aspirations and the personalities of their leaders and staff person-
nel. The aims of the union are necessarily moulded in some degree by
its leaders' desires and ambitions.
MANAGEMENT OBJECTIVES
Some objectives of management can be stated in general terms. The
first is to operate a business producing goods or rendering services in
a manner that enables the company to be competitive and to make a
profit. The concept of profit is not a precise one.32 What is a satisfac-
tory profit in one situation is not so in another. The relation of cost to
possible selling price is a fundamental question in bargaining from
management's viewpoint. Obviously, if costs, including labor costs,
are disproportionately high, the company will neither make a profit
nor be competitive. Another factor is that competition exists not only
between producers of the same commodity, but also between pro-
ducers of different commodities, for if one commodity becomes rela-
tively high in costs, consumers will choose other commodities. Thus,
employees of companies who do not remain competitive are faced with
insecurity and loss of employment. Management must necessarily
bargain to keep costs on a realistic basis. In most situations, there
is a fundamental difference of opinion between a union and a com-
pany as to what effect the demands of the union will have on the
ability of the company to maintain its competitive position and make
a satisfactory profit. There is.another reason why management gen-
erally has an obligation to bargain for realistic cost factors. The es-
sential nature of our dynamic economy requires a constant effort to
produce goods at the lowest reasonable costs to the consuming public.
In this respect, Professor Slichter is of the opinion that management
not only represents itself in bargaining on costs, but also represents
the consuming public. 3 It is clear that bargaining on costs entails con-
fliet, and the final solutions constitute an accommodation of the inter-
ests of the owners, the management, the employees, and the public.
A second objective of management is to assure its ability to continue
a healthy existence, including the right to make those decisions and
31. SLICHTER, UNION POLICIES AND INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT (1941).
32. DRUCKER, THE PRACTICE OF MANAGEIENT 34-48 (1954). Drucker points
out that it is the duty of business to survive. The precariousness of business, even
in large industrial companies, is sometimes overlooked. KAPLAN, BIG ENTERPRISE
IN A COMPETITIVE SYSTEMi (1954) points out that of the 100 largest industrial
concerns in 1909, only 36 were among the largest in 1948.
33. SLicHTR, THE CHALLENGE OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 30-35 (1947).
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to take those steps it considers necessary to protect the continuity of
its existence.3 1 Discussions of this objective tend to get entangled with
semantic arguments about management rights or prerogatives?3
Uions usually agree with the generality that management has the
right to run the business, but just what that right is in specific sit-
uations is productive of unending arguments. 5 What one management
will consider necessary, another will consider unimportant. The con-
flicts between management's desire for flexibilit, and the union's de-
sire for stability are obvious in such matters as the development of
new processes, products, or techniques which affect the skills, status,
or employment of the employees5 7 The automobile workers, for in-
stance, clearly proclaim that one of the objectives of the guaranteed
annual wage is to force management to gear technological change to
protect the interests of the existing work force of the automobile
manufacturers.3
A third objective of management is to develop a sound relationship
with its employees which will produce both employee job satisfaction
and good productivityPa* There are many instances where unions and
management do co-operate to achieve this objective,?° but the objective
:4. HILL & BOOK, TANAGENMENT AT THE BARGINING TARLE (1945).
3513 CHAMBERLAIN, THE UNION CHALLExGE To MANAGEMENT CoNTR oL (148).
. DIVsION or LABoR STANDARDS, U.S. DnrT OF LABOR, Bui&, No. 77, Ens-
IDENT'S NATIONAL LABOR-MANAGEMENT CoNFERENcE SumnARY AND Comnnr
R orols 57 (1945). At that conference the labor representatives agreed that
"the functions of management must be preserved if American business is to con-
tinue to be progressive and efficient." They, however, took the position that the
variety and complexities of relationships precluded the classification and specifica-
tion 4f rights and functions.
37 McMurry, War and Peace in Labor Relations, HARv. Bus. RBu., Nov.-Dec
1'55t p. 48,
:8. UAW (CIO), Progre-s Report on the Awnual Wage Program, 33 TAR
R.M. 14 (1953).
'm. In the last two decades, there has been a tremendous amount of experi-
mevitation and analysis on morale, job satisfaction, and productivity. See
GARIiDNER & Mom, HUM2AN REnxTiows rx INDusTRY (1955); HoSLnT, HUMAN
F V'T098 IN IANAGEMENT (1946) ; INDUSTRIAL RLATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION,
IDI STRIA. PRODUCrTIy (1951); KATZ, PRODUCTIVTY, SuPusioN, AND MORAJZ
r- NX Orrcn SITUATION (1950); PIGGORS & MYERS PERSONNE ADIMIIS-
TRATION (2d ed. 1951); ROETuLISBERGER & Dicsox, ICANAGE;iENT AND THE
WoRKER (1946); TROXELL, EMPLOYEE UNDERSTANDING AND TEAM WORK FOR
(GK TFR PRDuCTVn' (1954); VITELES, MOTIVATION AND MORALS IN INDUSTRY
(I353); WrHrE, MToNEY AND MOTIVATION (1955); B. & S. Selekman, Produw-
tlrrto-Aed Labor Relations, HARV. Bus. REV., Mlay 1949, p. 373; Worthy, Factors
inft . gchtg Emzployee Morale, HAv. Bus. Rm., Jan. 1950, p. 61.
40, CA'SE OF INDUSTRIAL PEACE UNDER COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (Golden &
Parker eds. 1955); WMLIASON & HARRiS, TRENDS rN CoLLEcTIvE BARGAINING
13,041 (1945); Dubin, Union Management Co-Operation and Productivity, 2 IND.
& LAP. Rmu. Rv. 195-209 (1949). HARuISON & COLEMAN, GOALS AND STRATEGY
IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 11-12 (1951) classifies union-management relations
as "armed truce," "working harmony" and "union-management co-operation."
They find that co-operation where the union assumes joint responsibility to in-
crease productivity and efficiency is rare. It has usually occurred where the
company fails to meet competition and is threatened with serious layoffs or a
closing of its doors. Under these circumstances, management is sometimes willing
to share management functions with the union and the union is willing to work
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is pregnant with conflicts. One question it raises is whether the rela-
tionship is bipartite, with only the company and union being involved,
or whether it is tripartite, and includes the employees. 41 It is not un-
common for a union to take the position that it has nothing to do with
the improvement of morale or productivity and that the matter is
solely the concern of management. There are many instances where
unions actively oppose management efforts to improve either morale
or productivity on the ground that such efforts are attempts either to
undermine the union, or to introduce a "speed-up," or to achieve some
objective detrimental to the interests of the union or the employees. 2
A fourth major objective of management is, similar to that of
unions, a reflection of the aspirations and personalities of those repre-
senting management.43 Some pride themselves on their abilities to get
along with people and to develop an atmosphere which motivates peo-
for productivity and efficiency in order to save jobs and increase economic benefits
for employees.
41. Barkin, Management Personnel Philosophy and Activities in a Collective
Bargaining Era, in PROCEEDINGS OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASS'N 329-30
(1953) takes the position that the union must become the exclusive agency for
communication and consultation with employees on matters other than job in-
struction. General Elec. Co., Year End Review, Employee Relations News Let-
ter, Dec. 31, 1954, sets forth the policy of directly communicating to employees
all information pertinent to employee interests. This is a part of a program, as
stated by BOULWARE, How ARE WE TRYING 27-35 (165 Am. Mgt. Ass'n Person-
nel Series) (1955) whereby General Electric wants "to do right voluntarily and
have everybody know that we are trying our best to do so." For a program of
union-management co-operation on communications, see STEPHENS, LABOR RELA-
TIONS IN UNITED STATES STEEL 34-37 (164 Am. Mgt. Ass'n Personnel Series)(1955). PURCELL, THE WORKER SPEAKS HIS MIND ON COMPANY AND UNION (1953)
finds that employees in the circumstances studied by him generally have dual
loyalty to both the company and the union as institutions. In specific situations,
however, both management and unions will make appeals for the loyalty of em-
ployees and in many instances the loyalties will be affected by these appeals.
42. Barkin A Trade Unionist Appraises Management Personnel Philosophy,
HARv. BUS. Rzv., Sept. 1950, p. 59; Corey, Human Relations Minus Unionism,
LABOR AND NATION, Spring 1950, pp. 48-51. Compare WHYTE, PATTERNS FOR IN-
DUSTRIAL PEACE (1951).
43. HARBISON & COLEMAN, op. cit. supra note 40, at 11-12. Any lawyer who has
had much experience in representing corporations in industrial relations is aware
of the complexities resulting from the different goals of management representa-
tives. A common type of situation is this: An existing contract provides for de-
partmental seniority applicable only to layoffs and rehiring. The union is de-
manding strict plant-wide seniority applicable to layoffs, rehiring, promotions,
transfers, and job vacancies, including bumping. The production vice-president is
unalterably opposed to such a proposal. The company's production record is the
best in the industry, and it is believed that this is due to the fact that skill and
ability apply to job assignments. The sales vice-president, who sees this year as
his biggest sales year, does not under any circumstances want to run the risk of
a strike. He thinks it should be settled at any cost so that the sales record will
not be ruined. The industrial relations director is proud of the fact he has always
been able to negotiate contracts without a strike, but he realizes that to concede
on this demand will adversely and seriously affect production and will jeopardize
his relationship with production personnel. On the other hand, to take a strike
will result in the sales department and customers putting on terrific pressures to
settle the strike immediately. Comparable dilemmas frequently occur. DRUCKER,'
THE NEW SocIrT (1950); Drucker, The Employee Society, 58 Am. J. Soc. 358
(1953).
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pie to work toward common goals. Others feel it is important to dem-
onstrate that they cannot be shoved around and that when they take a
position they know what they are doing. There are many variant
attitudes which affect the formulation of objectives.
The very stating of general objectives clearly shows that there are
basic conflicts between management and union. When these general
objectives are translated into specific situations these conflicts often
become sharper and more complex.
OBJECTIVES IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
Collective bargaining is a very workable process for resolving these
differences. This is evidenced by the thousands of contracts that are
successfully negotiated each year. Sincere, responsible, and intelli-
gent unions and managements have demonstrated that collective bar-
gaining can be most constructive and that the parties can accommo-
(late their interests harmoniously in a great variety of circumstances.
There have been some recent studies showing how collective bargain-
ing does operate constructively. These studies warrant close scrutiny
by all those involved in union-management relations. One of the most
outstanding of these studies is the National Planning Association's
series of reports on the causes of industrial peace under collective bar-
gaining, where the history and nature of bargaining between various
companies and the unions representing the employees of those com-
panies is reported and analyzed in illuminating detail.41
There is, however, one portion of the final report of the study which
is disturbing to some lawyers. The report states that "there was one
point on which virtually all companies and unions agreed in regard
to the make-up of the negotiating teams: the exclusion of lawyers."
The report further states that the aversion to lawyers "was best
summed up in the words of Sharon's president to a union official, 'I
know the steel business and you know the union business, so let's keep
44, There are some factors concerning the companies involved in the National
Planning Association studies which should be noted. For the most part the com-
panies were operating under comparatively ideal conditions. Clinton S. Golden
describes the typical environment of the companies studied as follows:
A medium-sized company with a steady production pattern and subject to
moderate technological advance; interesting and responsible jobs; an efficient
company with an expanding market and administered prices; a company
firmily established in a multi-industry community containing a tractable labor
force and paying wages which can readily be met in accordance with indus-
try standards; a community which is accustomed to collective bargaining; a
secure union with stable leaders and a homogeneous membership; a wage
pattern which the parties can use as a guide; some local autonomy for both
parties; a system which is well-established, and leaders on both sides who
ai c. experienced.
CAUSS OF INDUSTRIAL PEACD UNTDER COLLECMIvn BARGAINING 21 (Golden & Parker
eds. 11)55). Obviously, these conditions do not prevail in the typical situation
which confronts most lawyers.
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lawyers out of this so they won't obscure our mutual objectives.' "
The simplicity with which this statement is made is somewhat mis-
leading. No doubt there have been too many situations in which law-
yers have been obscurantists. Also, there is no doubt that the actual
bargaining is best done by the parties themselves, providing they
know what they are doing and have the ability to practice the art of
collective bargaining. After all, the parties do have the most intimate
knowledge of the operations and they do have to live with each other
under the contract. If they reach agreement directly, they are more
likely to have a better understanding of that agreement. It is for these
reasons that many lawyers encourage the parties to do their own bar-
gaining with the lawyer serving in an advisory capacity. Most con-
tracts today, however, have legal ramifications about which the par-
ties must be advised if they are to avoid some possible difficulties. 40
And there are many situations in which one or both parties want a
lawyer to participate in negotiations.
Companies are more prone to bring a lawyer into negotiations than
are unions. Indeed, unions frequently endeavor to convince companies
that they should not use lawyers. Unions have a traditional distrust of
lawyers.47 Moreover, where a lawyer is not present, unions generally
have a superior bargaining position, especially with respect to smaller
and many medium-sized employers. Here are some of the reasons.
Collective bargaining is virtually an everyday experience for most
union negotiators. They have developed psychological expertness in
all phases of bargaining. They have encountered most of the argu-
ments and know what arguments to make, and how and when to make
them-what economic pressures to apply, and how and when to apply
them. Union negotiators are constantly thinking about contract
clauses and demands. They receive assistance from their interna-
tionals, based on experience throughout the country, as to how con-
tract clauses can be improved to gain benefits for the union and its
members. The union negotiators often have the benefit of well-de-
veloped research departments, and frequently come to the bargaining
table with detailed information about the company and the industry.
45. Id. at 44.
46. Many contracts contain complex provisions relating to such matters as
welfare plans, pensions, and supplemental unemployment compensation which
involve not only questions of labor law but also questions of taxation, trusts, etc.
47. This distrust stems partly from the historical role lawyers played in the
issuance of injunctions during the period unions were struggling for recognition.
Additionally, the overly legalistic approach of some lawyers toward collective
bargaining and the ineptitude of some lawyers fostered distrust. Segal, Labor
Union Lawyers, 5 IND. & LAB. REL. REv. 343, 357 (1952). Unions even had, and
some still have, a reluctance to consult with their own attorneys. Kovner, The
Labor Lawyer, in THE HousE or LABoR 396 (Hardman & Neufeld eds. 1951);
Asher, The Lawyer in the Field of Labor, 1 LAB. L.J. 302 (1950).
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They always know what the contracts of other employers in the in-
dustry and in the area provide, and are able to pit the provisions of
the contract of one employer against those of another employer. The
union negotiators are, of course, adequately informed as to what fi-
nancial resources are available in the event of an impasse. In other
words, the union's negotiators are skillfully equipped to do an effec-
tive job of collective bargaining.
In some cases management negotiators are equally well-equipped.
This would be true, for example, in companies with adequately de-
veloped industrial relations departments, or companies with a back-
ground of matured association bargaining. A totally different situa-
tion, however, exists with respect to the average medium-sized or
small employer. In the average company, the person having the re-
sponsibility for bargaining also has a host of other duties concerning
such matters as production, finance, sales, or purchasing. He cannot
devote a substantial portion of his time throughout the year to think-
ing about contract negotiations. He does not have the opportunity to
acquire the requisite bargaining skills comparable to those of a union
negotiator. He sometimes fails to realize that collective bargaining is
a complex process involving many factors-psychological, economic,
political, and legal. He does not have the time, resources, or facilities
for gathering pertinent economic or contract data. Rarely does he
actually know in any detail what has been the experience of other
companies in bargaining on various clauses, or what is the effect of
those clauses on day-to-day operation, or even the cost of them. Some-
times impending negotiations strike terror in the heart of a manage-
ment representative. He feels incompetent and is at times virtually
inarticulate in the presence of the union negotiator. 48 Moreover, while
not acquainted with the details, he knows there are many pitfalls in
the bargaining process which might catapult him into unfair labor
practices. Consequently, a company will seek out someone to help in
this awesome situation-and that someone is usually a lawyer or an
industrial relations consultant.
When a client asks a lawyer to conduct or actively participate in
actual negotiations, he does so because he feels that the lawyer has the
skill, knowledge, and experience necessary to do a more effective job
of bargaining than the client can. By agreeing to participate in actual
negotiations the lawyer accepts the responsibility of helping to formu-
late and effectuate the objectives of the parties. In the bargaining
process the parties must be able to state their objectives, to discover
areas of agreement, and to resolve areas of disagreement. Normally,
unions have a much better idea of their specific objectives. This
is partly due to the fact that they are usually the proponents who want
to change the existing situation. Additionally, in their pursuit of
48. REISMAN, GLAzER & DENNY, THE LONELY CROWD 253 (1950).
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more, they can spell out their objectives quite tangibly in terms of
wages and other economic benefits. Management tends to have a nega-
tive approach to bargaining. 49 That is, management endeavors to re-
sist the union's demands and to hold the cost factors down to what it
considers reasonable. The resistance to union demands is a valid func-
tion of the bargaining process, but more companies are realizing that
collective bargaining also includes the idea that companies should take
positive positions. Consequently, more companies are coming to the
bargaining table with definite and positive industrial relations pro-
grams and philosophiesSo
The parties naturally place relative values on their various spe-
cific objectives. It is common for many unions to announce that cer-
tain demands are "musts," while other demands are subject to dis-
cussion. Companies, too, place relative values on their demands and
on the acceptance or rejection of the union demands. The initial
determination of the relative significance of the objectives is not a
permanent matter. The dynamics of the bargaining negotiations, with
the interplay of logic, facts, emotions, and power, means that the
values of the objectives are transitory and that even the objectives
themselves sometimes undergo a metamorphosis. Consequently, it is
necessary in the course of the negotiations to re-evaluate the objectives
in the light of what has transpired and what still lies ahead.
All of the specific objectives with respect to the contract have a
rather mercurial nature, subject to the final agreement on the total
contract. In re-evaluating the objectives, the parties might determine
the status of each objective on some such basis as this: (1) There are
the ideal objectives-those objectives the parties would wish if they
could have their own way. (2) There are the realistic objectives-
those objectives which they sincerely believe they should obtain. (3)
There are the acceptable objectives-those objectives which they feel
are not quite what they should obtain, but under the circumstances
they are willing to accept. (4) There are the demised objectives-
49. 'This attitude has partly resulted from the notion that negotiating a con-
tract is a process of transferring authority from the employer to the union. Those
who hold this attitude feel that what the company does not grant to the union,
it retains for itself. While there is considerable authority supporting this position
in some respects, it is clear that management does not always have the right of
unilateral control on issues not covered by the contract. Cox & Dunlop, Regulation
of Collective Bargaining by the National Labor Relations Board, 63 HARv. L. Ra-.
389 (1950). Unions tend to demand the elimination of management-rights clauses
or the limitation of such clauses to a few general items, and they use the argu-
ment that what is not given away is retained. There is a tendency at the present
time for management to spell out in some detail those "rights" which it feels
essential to the operation of the business.
50. Bureau of National Affairs, Bargaining Outline for Management, COLLEC-
TIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACTS 12:101; Gouger, Negotiating a
Competitive Company Union Contract, You ARE THERE AT .THE BARGAINING TABLE(a conference kit prepared by the Am. Mgt. Ass'n) (1955); Torff, Are You Ready
to Talk Contract? 32 PERSONNEL 51 (1955).
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those objectives which are abandoned in the course of bargaining,
either because they then seem inconsequential or because it became
obvious that to insist upon them would bring undesirable conse-
quences. (5) There are indominable objectives--those objectives
which the party will not abandon no matter what the consequences.
Perhaps I ought to mention one other type of objective which has a
very dubious place in bargaining, and that is the "sham" objective.
Sham objectives are those demands which are not seriously made, and
are comm only used to gain a psychological advantage by dropping the
sham demands in the course of negotiations. Then upon dropping the
sham demand, the party making it sanctimoniously claims that he has
giveit up something and that therefore the other party should give
up something.
The relativity of the various objectives is extremely important.
Obviously, if either party achieves what it considers either an ideal
or realistic agreement with respect to its prime objectives, it is more
willing to abandon other objectives or agree upon them on an accept-
abhl basis. On the other hand, if a prime objective is blocked entirely
or is not attainable on an acceptable basis, there is a tendency for
other objectives to become enlarged.: This situation is something like
a balloon which becomes enlarged when pushed on one side. Also like
a balloon, if the pressure is too violent, or the limits of expansion are
reached, there is an explosion. Experienced bargainers are sensitive
to these limits and are usually able to make accommodations so that
a contract is negotiated.
After the contract is completed, the parties enter into their day-to-
day relations under the contract. This presents a totally different
situation because negotiators are not the only ones involved. Foremen,
shop stewards, and employees are also directly concerned in the ad-
ministration of the contract. The better the foremen, the stewards,
and employees understand the contract, the more likely it will be
a(ministered constructively. Of course, there are instances where
either one or both parties carry on a battle of hostility and endeavor
to use the contract as an instrument of harassment. But assuming
good faith in efforts to make the contract work, there is always the
question of how adequately the contract has been drafted to meet the
problems of daily operations. No matter how artfully drafted, it is
01, Thc parties try to plan their bargaining strategy to provide for this con-
tingency. Many unions propose that the bargaining proceed by considering and
reaching agreement item by item starting with the "non-cost" or "non-economic
items and then proceeding down to such economic items as wages. Consequently,
if an impasse should occur, the union would have an economic issue involved which
has greater employee and public appeal. Additionally, wages are more flexible
in making concessions than items involving "principles," such as the union shop.
Management generally proposes discussing the whole contract, reaching tentative
agreement on the specific items subject to reaching total agreement on the whole
contract.
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indeed an unusual contract which will not be subject to interpretation
.or which will have anticipated all conceivable problems which could
arise under it. Consequently, there will be grievances. The presenta-
tion of grievances, assuming they are not made for harassment pur-
poses, performs useful functions. Not only does the grievance pro-
cedure, if utilized by both the company and the union, lead to an ad-
herence to the agreement, it also indicates to management and union
how the operation can be improved.5 2 The nature of the grievances
that do arise and the attitudes of the parties in processing the griev-
ances have a considerable effect on the next negotiating session.51
There is one set of objectives which I will not discuss in any detail
and those are the political objectives. These objectives have received
some emphasis lately because of the merger of the AFL and the CI0.
George Meany recently said:
It goes without saying that labor unity will provide a more
effective instrument for political action. Our major objective is
to elect strong liberal majorities to Congress. Thus we can
reverse the trend of recent years which has resulted in the enact-
ment of such union-busting legislation as the Federal Taft-
Hartley Act and the misnamed state "right-to-work" laws. These
laws are a continuing threat to the very existence of unions. 4
No doubt, both management and union will endeavor to secure legis-
lation they consider favorable to their position and to block what
they consider to be unsound. Legislative changes, as well as changes
in political climate, will in turn affect other objectives of the parties."
52. Ryder, Some Concepts Concerning Grievance Procedure, 7 LAD. L.J. 15
(1956).
53. Lens, Meaning of the Grievance 'Procedure HAPV. Bus. REv. Nov. 1948,
p. 713; Shulman, Reason, Contract and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REV.
999 (1955).
54. Meany, On The Threshold of AFL-CIO Unity in the United States, St.
Louis Labor Tribune, Dec. 1, 1955, p. 1, col. 6.
55. In some instances unions endeavor to use collective bargaining to produce
legislative changes. The UAW report on the guaranteed annual wage states:
The fourth principle endorsed by the Convention provides that:
Guaranteed payments should be integrated with state unemployment com-
pensation benefits so that employers can reduce their liabilities by effectively
working toward the improvement of the state laws.
There is the same kind of lag in unemployment compensation behind wages
and living costs as there was in the case of pensions. Our efforts to improve
pensions on the legislative front were fruitless until we negotiated collective
bargaining pension plans which provided for integration with federal pen-
sions.
Once we had done that, the corporations became actively interested injoining with us instead of blocking our efforts to raise the level of federal
pensions.
UAW (CIO), Progress Report on UAW'S Annual Wage Program, 33 L.R.R.M.
21 (1953).
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OBJECTIVES AND THE STRIKE
From time to time in this discussion we have referred to the strike.
In the last decade or so, there have been some general trends in
strikes which should be noted. Formerly, a great many strikes were
of an emotional and precipitous nature. Some strikes occurred with-
out anybody really knowing what their causes were. I can remember
some strikes in the coal mines in the Hocking Valley which were called
by the simple device of a loader leaving the face of the mine, picking
up his water pail and spilling some water as he passed other men. The
spilling of water meant a walkout. The other men would pick up
their pails and spill water as they passed still other men. Sometimes
when everybody got to the tipple it was difficult to find out what it
was all about. Not a single word would have been spoken regarding
the reason for the walkout. There are still some strikes of a pre-
ci p itous nature, particularly "wildcats."5 There are also some strikes
that appear to be almost inevitable. Their occurrence seems essential
to clear the air, or to serve some purpose other than to force a settle-
ment of the issues in dispute.',
Where there is an established bargaining relationship, there is a
tendency for the parties to look upon the strike as an economic power
weapon of dangerous potential which must be used only after a care-
ful calculation as to the possibilities of its achieving the desired goals.
Consideration is also given to the question of whether or not the
achievement of those goals is worth the risk of the dangers involved
in the strike. An official strike arising out of the bargaining rela-
tionship ordinarily involves both a decision by the union to call the
strike and a decision by management to take the strike 9 Prior to
56. GOITLDNER, WILDCAT STRIKE (1954); Sayles, Wildcat Strikes, HARV. Bus.
REV., Nov.-Dec. 1954, pp. 42-51.
57. Strikes cannot always be explained in terms of calculations of the prac-
tical economist. There have been strikes to strengthen the solidarity of a
union or to improve or alter an internal situation within a union, or even to
satisfy a whim, idea, prejudice, emotion, or conviction of a leader or a
faction.
Senate Labor & Public Welfare Committee, Factors in Successful Collective Bar-
gaininfi, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (Comm. print 1951). DRUCKER, THE NEW SocIETY
118-19 (1950) points out that in a number of strikes in 1946 the apparent issues
could have been settled without a strike, but:
Tho real purpose of the strikes was to display the power of the union to its
own members and to the public, to overcome strife and conflicts within the
union, or to beat a rival union. The strike as "symbolic violence" becomes an
end in itself.
See also KNOWLEs, STRIKES (1952); STAGNER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INDUSTRIAL
CONFLICT 414-48 (1946).
58. CHAMBERLAIN & SCHILLING, THE IMPACT OF STRIKES (1954); Ross, The
Natural Hisfory of the Strike, in INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT 23 (Kornhauser, Dubin &
Ross eds. 1954).
59. There are, of course, some official strikes, such as jurisdictional and inter-
nal political strikes, which are called even though management does not make a
decision to take a strike. Also in some situations, there are lockouts or work
stoppages where it can be debated whether the stoppage is a strike or a lockout.
The use of the lockout by employers as an economic weapon (i.e., excluding its
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the occurrence of most official strikes there is a period of uncertainty
during which the parties endeavor to determine how seriously the
other is facing the strike possibility. The union usually takes a strike
vote and informs management that a strike will occur if certain con-
cessions are not made. Management will sometimes state that it has
seriously considered the matter and while not wanting a strike will
take one rather than make certain concessions. The threat of a strike
or the statement of a willingness to take a strike is far different
from the actual occurrence of the strike. At this stage there is often
a period of bluffing and of psychological pressures calculated to pro-
duce changes in positions or to lead to a discovery of some adjustment
that allows one or both parties to rationalize the results of a settle-
ment. The history of the relationship of the parties plays a crucial
role during this unsettled period which is pregnant with strike
possibilities. If both parties mean what they say, and each knows
this from past relations, a strike is likely to occur only where the
issues are clear and the parties have thoroughly explored the alterna-
tives. On the other hand, if, in the past, the parties' words and actions
have been inconsistent or their attitudes have been of a blustering or
indecisive nature, the possibilities of a precipitous strike are greater.
Before a strike occurs, there is a point where the parties re-examine
the issue or issues, and sometimes they shift emphasis on the issues
at stake. The reason for this is that each wants to be on a ground
which it feels will seem soundest to the employees and to the public.
For instance, if a union is demanding the elimination of a manage-
ment rights clause and a wage increase, it will tend to shift to the
wage increase as the strike issue. Also at this point, the parties tend
to "render all the fat" out of their positions. 0 If they do not, they are
use as an anti-union weapon) is an unsettled question. In Morand Bros. Beverage
Co. v. NLRB, 190 F.2d 576, 582 (7th Cir. 1951) the court said, "the lockout should
be recognized for what it actually is i.e. the employer's means of exerting eco-
nomic pressure on the union, a corollary'of the union's right to strike." On re-
mand the NLRB disagreed with the court. 99 N.L.R.B. 1448 (1952). See Littler,
The Right to Lockout, in A.B.A. PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECTION 01 LABOR RELA-
TIONS 4 (1952); Petro, The NLRB On Lockouts, 3 LAD. L.J. 659, 739 (1952).
Subsequently, on a second appeal in the Morand case, the court criticized the
NLRB for not following "the law of the case." Morand Bros. Beverage Co. v.
NLRB, 204 F.2d 529, 532 (7th Cir. 1953). In a later case the NLRB approved the
action of one employer who belonged to a multiple-employer bargaining unit
temporarily locking out its employees after the union had struck other members
of the unit. Buffalo Linen Supply Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 447 (1954). The majority
clearly stated, however, that the decision "does not establish that the employer
lockout is the corollary of the employees' statutory right to strike." Id. at 448.
The Board based its position on the reasoning of Leonard v. NLRB, 205 F.2d 355(9th Cir. 1953) which justified the temporary lockout as a means of protecting the
nonstruck employers of the association from the whipsawing tactics of the union.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit did not agree with the NLRB,
however, and set aside the board's order. Local 449, Teamsters Union, AFL v.
NLRB (1956). The court stated that it thought the reasoning in the Leonard
case was erroneous.
60. There are differences of opinion as to how much the pre-strike offers
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setting the stage for subsequent strikes. Here is an example. An
employer offers an increase of 3 cents per hour, but he knows that if
there is a strike he will give 5 cents to settle the strike. On the second
()I third day of the strike he gives the 5 cent increase and the strike
is settled. From then on, the union is never sure that the final offer
is meaningful and it will be inclined to strike just to see if more
could not be produced shortly. The same sort of relative position
occurs where the union calls a strike it has to abandon on short order.
Of course, unions have a more difficult problem. The expectations of
the members might be of such a nature, either because they have been
overly whetted by the leaders or for other reasons, that the nego-
tiators are out on a limb, and the strike, although unwise, is unavoid-
able. Calculated strikes are considered in terms of the potential length
of the strike. If one party has sufficient power to be sure the strike
will be won almost immediately, that is within a week or so, the po-
tentials of the strike are not forbidding to that party. Increasingly,
the parties are realizing that if a strike cannot be settled within a
week or so of its commencement, then the parties must be prepared
for a strike of considerable duration.
Once a strike occurs, the aims of the parties become much differ-
ent from pure negotiating aims. Sometimes the objectives become
the winning of the strike even at the risk of annihilating one of the
parties-that is, even at the risk of forcing a company out of business
or breaking a union. In the process of the strike, the union usually
has two immediate goals. The first is to place the maximum economic
pressure on the employer-to cut him off from his suppliers and his
customers, and to prevent him from doing business of any kind.,,
This is done by the picket line, the boycott, the "hot cargo" clause, and
other devices. The second is to build up and maintain the morale of
the members so that the strike will be fully supported and so that
there will be no inclination on the part of the employee-members to
go back to work.4' - This calls for strike benefits and other measures
to meet the economic needs of the employees, and for the building up
of the esprit de corps of the members by picket line involvement and
by convincing them of the "rightness" of the strike. Attacks on the
employer as being vicious, calloused, union-busting, or as being an ex-
should reallv be "final" positions. There are some who believe that certain con-
cessions sh;uld be retained until after the strike occurs and then used for face-
saving purposes in reaching a settlement. Helmer, When Management Faces a
Strike, 32 PERSONNEL 66 (1955). There is a distinction between reserving a
specific matter solely for settlement purposes as against having alternate plans
as potential bases for settlement or developing a flemble position which will en-
able one to adjust to developments resulting from the strike. See PETERS, STRATEGY
AND TACTICS IN LABOR NEGOTIATIONS (1955); Lind, How to Handle Crisis Bar-
gain,!;, 31 PERSONNEL 151 (1954).
6;1, Petro, Picketing and Labor Strategy, 2 LAB. L.J. 243, 312 (1951).
t62. STEUBEN, STRIKE STRATEGY (1950).
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ploiting profiteer are not uncommon. Violence frequently develops,
particularly if the employer continues to operate.
The company's objectives during the strike are dependent upon one
basic decision-whether it will try to operate or whether it will close
its operations and wait out the strike. A number of factors determine
the decision. Some of them are: the nature of the issues, whether they
are employee-related issues or union-institutional-related issues; the
morale of the employees, whether they actively support the strike or
whether they simply go along with it; and the nature of the employer's
business, If the customers can satisfy their needs elsewhere there will
be little customer pressure to settle the strike, but the employer might
permanently lose some customers to other sources. On the other hand,
a strike which entirely cuts off the needs of the customers, such as a
city-wide drayage strike, creates tremendous customer pressure on
the employer to settle the strike at any price or to operate at any price.
If the business is seasonal, a strike at the peak of the season calls for
different responses from those needed in a strike during a slack period.
One of the greatest deterrents to operating the business in the face of
a strike is the possibility of violence. As long as the business does not
operate, the union feels that the odds are in its favor, and that even-
tually the company will succumb, providing that at the same time
there is not too much pressure by the employees to settle the strike so
that they can return to work. On the other hand, if the business is not
entirely closed or if it successfully commences operations, the odds are
that the strike will not succeed. Consequently, when a business con-
tinues or resumes operations, the union reacts as if it sees defeat. This
situation of a company operating in face of a strike presents the most
difficult one in the power relationship between a union and a company.
It is here, of course, that the conflict spills most vigorously over into
the courts and the NLRB. Out of this conflict a solution must be
found. The lawyer can and should be useful in finding a solution even
though he is in a sense a partisan in the conflict. The reasons are that
the lawyers of the two parties constitute one of the few lines of com-
munication between the parties, and the lawyers in their professional
capacities can talk about potential areas of settlement that the parties
themselves would not, and sometimes could not, dare talk about. In
this connection, some of the elements of settlement should be noted.
Except for precipitous strikes and for strikes calculated to produce
immediate results, it is not uncommon for the parties to have no com-
munication with each other for a week or so. Then contact is usually
made through the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. Of
course, many strikes are averted through the assistance of a skillful
conciliator who can propose alternatives the parties had not consid-
ered, clarify confusion between the parties, and in other ways facili-
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tate agreement. While he has no compulsory powers, a conciliator
often provides a basis for finding a solution to the dispute.
If conciliation does not produce a settlement, then some other ap-
proach must be made. The settlement of a lengthy strike is seldom
the white flag of complete capitulation. Mlore likely the settlement is
reached through an oblique approach. This does not necessarily mean
there must be a compromise on the basic issues or that the predomi-
nant power is not recognized. These factors are muted to some degree,
and some method is reached so that operations can be resumed con-
structively. Reaching an oblique settlement often requires consider-
able ingenuity.'r Experienced lawyers can, by working together, often
d(evelop the basis of settlement.
CONCLUSION
In discussing the nature of the conflicts that can arise between man-
agement and unions, I do not intend in any way to imply that every
effort should not be made to develop healthy and harmonious relation-
ships. Differences of opinion there will always be. The challenge is
to resolve these differences intelligently and without unnecessary
strife. A realization of the dangers of strikes and open warfare may
itself be a substantial deterrent to their occurrence. A perceptive real-
ism is most helpful in establishing a solid foundation for healthy
tin ion-management relations.
One of the most frequent condemnations about lawyers in labor re-
lations is the charge that lawyers do not really understand what is in-
volved, and that their advice leads either to unnecessary conflict or to
unworkable agreements. Unfortunately, there are enough instances
whiere this is true, that we cannot make a blanket denial of the charge.
The lawyer who undertakes work in labor relations assumes great
responsibilities, because anything he does or advises can have ramifi-
cations far beyond a mere answer to a legal question. As
said by Judge Wyzanski, the lawyer "invariably advises his client
upon not only what is permissible but also what is desirable. And it
is in the public interest that the lawyer should regard himself as more
than predicter [sic] of legal consequences. His duty to society as well
as to his client involves many relevant social, economic, political, and
philo1sophical considerations."-
We lawyers in all our work emphasize the importance of prepara-
6". Vei y often a strike will be settled on issues which were not present at the
tme the strike commenced. For instance, if there had been violence during the
strike, the reinstatement of those participating in the violence might become a
basis of settlement. Similarly, if either party commenced litigation or NLRB
proceedings after the commencement of the strike, the withdrawal of such pro-
ceedings might become a basis of settlement.
64. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 359 (D. Mass.
1950).
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tion, of getting and knowing all facts and data relevant to the prob-
lem before us. In this respect the labor relations field is more difficult
than some other fields of law. The preparation must include the ac-
quiring and understanding and knowledge of many dynamic elements
involved in union-management relations, such as the economic, psy-
chological, political, and social factors. Unfortunately, this kind of
understanding and knowledge cannot be found in the books on short
notice. It takes time, diligence, and experience.8 Indeed, any lawyer
who undertakes union-management problems without such an ade-
quate preparation runs a great risk of injuring his client, himself, and
the profession." On the other hand, the acquisition of such under-
standing and knowledge, and the development of the ability to advise
management or unions soundly, present a stimulating challenge which
many lawyers have met most successfully. 7 Such lawyers have made
admirable contributions to the establishment of sound and construc-
tive union-management relations.
65. Wells, Negotiation of Collective Bargaining Contracts from the Standpoint
of the Union, in READINGS ON LABOR LAw 122 (Reynard ed. 1955).
66. An all too common situation where a lawyer is called into negotiations is
where he demonstrates his legal knowledge and his rhetorical powers of argument.
He ties the other side in knots. His client may even be pleased about the way he
makes an argument the other side cannot answer. Perhaps the representatives
of the other side cannot answer the argument, but their position may become
solidified so that virtually nothing will alter it. They may be snowed under, but
they will wait until the snow melts. CARPENTER, EiPLOYERS' ASSOCIATIONS AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN NEw YORK CITY 181 (1950). Carpenter also states,
"Everyone is agreed that some of the most successful representatives of em-
ployers' associations and of labor unions in New York City are lawyers. The
weight of the evidence, however, is against the use of legally trained men, except
for advice on points of law, at any stage of group bargaining activities." Id. at
330 n.27. See also Ching & Stavisky, Good Bargaining is Good Business, Nation's
Business, Dec. 1949, p. 41.
67. Kelley, Collective Bargaining, MICH. ST. B.J., Feb. 1951, pp. 14, 18-19
states:
The presence of legal counsel during negotiations is not universally ac-
cepted. We prefer to have him with us during all of our negotiating sessions.
. . . Some of the advantages of having counsel present are these: Being
an outside person, he often has a fresh point of view. Then, too, he usually
has had experience with other unions and other companies, which can be very
useful and helpful during the period of negotiations. This is important be-
cause the union international representatives spend most of their time ne-
gotiating. Since counsel has often negotiated many different contracts, he
can give his client the benefit of broader experience. Thus, counsel is often
in a position to evaluate proposals in terms of what others are doing better
than the company representatives can, themselves. He will have an oljective-
ness often difficult for the management committee to maintain.
See also Fuller, Caples & Haggerty, Panel Discussions-The Role of the Lawyer
in Labor Relations, in A.B.A. PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECTION OF LABOR RELATIONS
23-32 (1954).
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